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22. Institutional crisis and the policy agenda
Christopher Ansell, Arjen Boin, and
Sanneke Kuipers
WHEN INSTITUTIONS STORM THE AGENDA
In the policy literature, crisis plays a common role in explaining policy
change. The standard insight in the agenda setting literature holds that
crises force issues onto the political agenda (Kingdon, 1984; Keeler, 1993).
These issues slip through a briefly opened "window of opportunity,"
cracked open by a crisis. Crises are thus an important independent vari-
able, as they help to explain what so many theories cannot explain: the
punctuation of stable policy frameworks.
But sometimes, the independent variàble 
- 
crisis 
- 
becomes the phenom-
enon that needs to be explained. This happens when the institutional char-
acter of an entire policy sector is called into question (Boin and 't Harl,
2000; Alink, Boin, and 'tH.art,2001; Ansell and Vogel, 2006). We refer to
these situations as institutional crises. It is not so much the details of policy
that become politicized and climb the agenda; it is a broad-based challenge
to institutional arrangements that takes over and temporarily consumes
multiple agendas. An institutional crisis gives rise to a distinctive kind of
agenda setting process that needs to be distinguished from the standard
process of policy change.
An institutional crisis occurs when "the institutional integrity of a policy
sector is at stake" (Boin and 't Hart, 2000, p.l2). Ansell and Vogel (2006)
refer to these situations in terms of 'ocontested governance": a 'oparticu-
larly intense and broad-based conflict about the fundamental assumptions
and institutional frameworks through which a policy domain is governed,'(p.12).In both cases, intense criticism erupts over the basic institutional
arrangements and orienting assumptions that govern a policy sector.
The legitimacy of that sector 
- 
what it stands for and how it functions 
-
declines rapidly, exposing its institutional core (Boin and 't Hart, 2000).
Hurricane Katrina provides a textbook example. When Hurricane
Katrina struck in August 2005, it revealed structural defîciencies in the
U.S. federal disaster response system (Cooper and Block, 2006).t One
could argue that the magnitude and complexity of the catastrophe would
have defied any level of preparedness. The federal government delivered
415
+ro tlctnaoooK oI puoltc potrcy agendq setttng
"record levels of support to Hurricane Katrina's victims, states and emer-
gency responders" (OIG, 2006, p.2). yet, the Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would conclude six months
later that "the federal government, in particurar the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), received widespread criticism for a slow
and ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina. Much of the criticism is
warranted" (OIG, 2006, p. l).
Since FEMA had been absorbed by the much larger DHS in 2001, it
had lost much of its budget and its autonomy. congreis and the president
moved FEMA's previous responsibility for preparedness programs to a
new offrce within DHS. As a result, "turf wars put distance ¡ãtwãen the pre-
paredness, response and recovery offices,, (Roberts, 2006a,p.24). The Bush
administration filled the agency with political appointees 
--r,r.i, as succes-
sive FEMA directors Allbaugh and Brown 
- 
who lacked the congressional
contacts, experience and expertise of their predecessors (Roberts, 2006b,
pp.77, 83). FEMA's ranking dropped over the years to the bottom of a
2003 survey and to 29 out of30 in a2005 survey on worker satisfaction in
government agencies (Barr, 2005). Increasing personnel turnover sapped
the agency's force of highly qualified and experienced employees (Robeits,
2006a, p.24). All these characteristics and structural shorttomings were
revealed, amplified, and scrutinized in media coverage, political hãarings,
and formal investigations after Katrina aftracred,attentión to FEMA.
The Katrina disaster became the symbolic incident that laid bareFEMA's perceived state of decomposition (Roberts, 2013). Simplified
comparisons and causalities, bold statements, accusations and a flood of
incriminating examples of the agency's failure dominated the headlines
and news coverage for weeks on end. Suddenly, FEMA had transformed
*from 
a leading light of public administration into a laggard,, (Roberts,
2006b, p.57). state and local authorities had lost ro 
-u.h-fuith in FEMA
after Katrina that they ramped up their own preparations for the next
disaster (Bliss and Niquette, 2011).
An institutional crisis is likely to have some or all of the following
characteristics:
. intense critical media and public scrutiny of existing institutional
arrangements;
r interpretation ofspecific institutional errors or failures as reflections
of the chronic or systemic failure of governing arrangements;
o a serious challenge to basic authority patterns and to the legitimacy
of the policy sector's governing arrangements as a whole;¡ calls for broad-based reform and opportunities for significant
institutional innovation; and
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o reform proposals driven by the need to restore authority, trust, and
legitimacy.
All governance is contested to a lesser or greater extent, but such contesta-
tion rarely shifts from the details of policy to the basic foundations of the
policymaking system. When it does, the resulting crisis not only influences
policy agendas or provides a critical push to pending policy reform plans;
institutional crises bring to the fore the content of policymaking as well as
the philosophy behind the policy and the structures, rules, and organ:za-
tions governing a policy sector. Following Alink, Boin, and 'tIJ.art (2001),
we refer to this distinction as t};re software (policy and philosophy content)
and the hardware (structures, rules, governing arrangements) of a policy
sector. When both software and hardware are contested, the future of a
policy sector is at stake.
The question we seek to answer in this chapter pertains to the process
through which such crises emerge. When and how do fundamental institu-
tional arrangements come to dominate political and policy agendas? How
does this happen? What can policy leaders do to prevent this? In addition,
we are interested in the consequences of these institutional crises. The
policy literature suggests that crises create windows for policy reform. But
is the same true when the basic institutions that govern a policy sector lose
critical support? Do crisis-driven reform efforts emerge and, if so, under
which conditions?
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In our effort to sketch a theoretical framework that can help address
these questions, we draw on earlier work (Boin and't Hart, 2000; Ansell
and Vogel, 2006; Kuipers, 2006) and combine this with insights from the
agenda setting literature. Our model owes much to Kingdon's (1984)
multiple streams approach (MSA), as well as the punctuated equilibrium
theory (PET) developed, in particular, by Baumgartner and Jones (1991).
We borrow key concepts from these perspectives to understand the func-
tioning of a policy sector as an institutional field: policy venues, policy
images, positive an( negative feedback, among others. But we argue that
the mechanisms of institutional agenda setting are different from those
that pertain to policy agendas. To be clear, the agenda setting literature
aims to explain certain patterns of policy change and as such is highly
valuable. But these approaches do not fully illuminate some of the key
dynamics and mechanisms of an institutional crisis.
Our perspective builds on the classic idea that policy sectors vary in
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lglms of the strength of their institutionalization. Following selznick(1957), we understand a strongly institutionalized policy sectoås iraving
well-articulated organizational and governing siructires with clearlydefined goals, rules, values, and taskì. Integration is perhaps the keydimension of selznick's concept of institutionalization. À strångly insti_
tutionalized policy sector is highly integrated across multiple institutional
dimensions, with a good fit between skills, ,.rorrrc"r, und organizational
structures on the one hand, and tasks and problems on the other. It enjoys
well-established authority and leadership structures, a supportive political
environment , and a wer-defined, t"sp"ct"d, and normaiivery sanctioned
mission. By contrast, a weakly institutionalized poricy sector is 
-or. rrug-mented and suffers from contested authority urri r.giti*ucy gaps. strong
and weak institutionalization, of course, are understood herã aì two endpoints on a continuum.
our key point is quite simple. The strength of the institutionalization of
a policy sector will affect both its propensity to undergo an institutional
crisis and its ability to adapt to and wìather a crisis. Institutionalizafion
will shape the incubation period leading up to the crisis, the p.ecifitation
of the crisis, rhe agenda for institutionãr ìeform, and íhe .t"*;Ë of the
crisis. contrary to the standard interpretation of punctuated equíibria inthe agenda setting literature, oor urgo-.rrt is thât institutional inertia is
only one facet of how institutionalizationaffects crisis. Institutionalization
may contribute to and escalate institutional crisis by creating recalcitrance
and hence triggering cals for more systematic change. Howiver, àn atter-
native reading of institurionalization is that it fJcilitates pre-åàptive,
cooperative, and adaptive change. we argue that taking botir interpreta-
tions into account yields a more nuancedãnd powerfur-understanding ofinstitutional crises and their associated agendaietting procesr.r. 
_--
The outcome of these crisis-induced lrocesses atsã aepenos on howinstitutions cope with the storm. The crisis management capacities of theseinstitutions matter (Boin and ,tHart,2000). W; speak oi..nign ag"rrcy,,
and "low agency" to denote the institutioíal capacitie, io 
-uäõå ,rr.r.institutional crises.
. 
We develop this argument in the following sections. First, we explainhow institutional crises come about: the incubation before escalation. wethen probe the nexus between institutionar izationuoo ug"o"y ùà.u,rr. *.
argue that incubation may lead to upheavar, negative 
-rãiu aitention, anda shift of priorities (in other words: escalation) on the politicat agenda, andyet it will impact different sectors in different ways because of tle existing
capaciÍy to respond to a crisis. Hence, various ìeform paths maf come
about. we conclude with a brief reflection on the possible conr.lu.n.., or
our thinking for theory and practice.
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RIGIDITY AND CHANGE: EXPLAINING THE
EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
The agenda setting literature is underpinned by a view of institutional path
dependence that regards institutional equilibria as robust and inertial. The
equilibrium is regarded as internally self-reinforcing and hard to dislodge.
It can only be disrupted by external shock, the impetus for reform. Thùs,
this perspective distinguishes rather sharply between periods of stability
and periods of change. An external shock (or crisis) sets off a period of
change that eventually leads to a new equilibrium. punctuated.qLitibrirr*
approaches focus on the policy paradigm (the software), the oog"rrom
shock, (external) entrepreneurs, agenda shifts, and policy changàs that
follow. The sudden breakdown of support for a certain policy und it, ,rrp-
porting institutional arrangements are, in other word.s, very much taken
for granted. white we acknowledge the importance of exiernal shocks,
we understand the breakdown of external support for the institutional
arrangements of a policy sector primarily as a result of endogenous devel-
opments. More specifically, we explain institutional crises as the outcome
of insritutional erosion: an incubation process in which institutional perfor-
mance slowly comes to be seen as problematic by key stakeholders. This
happens not only because these stakeholders changè their views of the
policy sector in question; it happens because the policy sector in question
does not adapt to a changing world.
An institutional crisis revolves around what we refer to as ,,performance
deficits." No policy is perfectly executed; there is no policy sector that
meets all its goals, as that is simply impossible (Hood, t97o; wilson, l9g9).
There is, in other words, always a gap between what policy sectors promise
to deliver and what they actually do. A "performance deficit,, is nót neces-
sarily problematic. In fact, we might say that a performance deficit is both
assumed and accepted: we do not expect the police to catch all criminals,
nor do we expect schools to graduate al1 students or hospitals to heal all
patients. As long as public organizations keep the performance gap within
reasonable limits, support for the sector and its arrangements strould not
be affected (cf. Hong and Sohn, 2014).
Critiques of this gap are typically fragmented. They may nibble away
at the legitimacy of the sector, but they rarely align in á single storm
of critique and touch the "core logic" of a policy sãctor. An eiample is
agricultural policy in the u.s. This is built on a complex set of govern-
ment support policies for farmers, designed to overcome various kinds of
agricultural market failures. It has led to a strong clientelist relationship
between the u.s. Department of Agriculture and iatmers. There has been
direct critique of these institutional arrangements for years that argues
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that this is corporate welfare as opposed to support for family farmers.
However, this direct attack on the core logic of this sector has had little
impact. Nevertheless, a raîge of critiques operating at the margins of
this sector has had more traction. An exampie is thã expanding 
"ìitiq,r.of obesity, which has been attributed to the strategies of subsidization of
"industrialized agriculture" (Nestle, 20 I 3).
An institutional crisis denotes the moment that a performance deficit
å¿s become a perceived problem. when citizens, media, and stakeholders
construe its performance deficit as indicative of deeper problems in the
sector, support for that sector and its policies will wane. when the per-
formance denicit attracts potitical attention, the problems for the sector
will mount. The Baumgartner and Jones (1991) framework provides us
with the conceptual tools to describe this crisis process: tone^ and venue
change mark the escalation; it is the critical phãse in which Kingdon,s(19B4) streams merge. The crisis comes into full view when a ,,foòusing
event" sgnbolizes the performance problems of the sector and channels
the latent criticism; it marks the moment that the performance gap comes
to be understood as a "blameworthy failure." In the media fienzy that
ensues, this failure is quickly elevated to a major political concern (Boin
and't Hart, 2000).
. 
But why does one policy sector become the subject of intense poriticaa-
tion, whereas others sputter forward unnoticed (and usually unioveo)?
The performance deficit itself c-annot explain this variance. úe know of
cases in which the performance of a policy sector had actually improved
in the years leading up to an institutional órisis. The Dutch priroo sector,for instance, became the subject of an institutional crisis in the early 1990s.A series of dramatic escapes put the prison sector in the spotlight. Media
attention rose, political venues changed, and reforms *rrã i-ior.d. one
might conclude that a "focusing event" had punctuated the staius quo and
created a window for change. But the actual performance of the Dutch
sector had been on the rise: when the crisis broke, the number of escapeshad never been so low. In fact, the number of escapes t ao consisterrtty
dropped in the preceding decade, starting with 4 oìt of 1,000 inmates
lcanin_S in l984,to 2 per 1,000 in 1990, and I per 1,000 in 1992 (Boin andOtten, 1996).
This example brings home an important point: the absolute perfor-
m¿nce of a policy sector is often less importanith anthe perceived iirection
of the performance deficit. To illustrate this point we must ¡eturn to the
stat's quo, which marks the moment in time that the sector's performance
is taken for granted and only routinely discussed in technical venues. This
stability is of course temporary and always under threat. vrrto.ruuitity to
an institutional crisis is created by conditìons that disrup, ,n" rrt u"ì*."r,
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an institutionalized policy sector and its environment. This dealignment
can occur either because policy sectors change while their environment
stays the same or because environments change while policy sectors
remain the same.
when a policy sector changes core arrangements (hardware) or alters its
interpretation of formal policy aims (software), it invites critical scrutiny.2
But when a sector keeps everything the same, because it always worked
nicely and was appreciated widely, a crisis may eventuafly be in the offing
as well. The Selective service system, led by General Herschey since 1941,
rigidly held on to its administrative practices of military conscription
throughout the vietnam war and faced major domestic unrest t"guidittg
the draft practices until President Nixon promoted the General out of
office in 1970 and abolished military conscription.
Perceptions and preferences change over time. As a result, public expec-
tations will shift. As expectations gradualry shift, the performance deficit
widens. In complexity theory terms, this change might be characterized as
moving 'ofar from equilibrium." It usually is a slow process and there are
few markers of shifting expectations, which may lead to growing discon-
tent and widening gaps. This process, when left unattended, will eventually
reach a "tipping point" and "punctuate" into a crisis (and to the untrained
eye it will seem like this crisis comes out of nowhere). This has been
described elsewhere in terms of an incubation process in which the patho-
gens for future crisis begin to build (Turner, 197g; Boin and ,t Hart,1000).
To explain why this incubation process affects some sectors and not
others, we return to the work of Philip selznick (1957). selznick's ideal-
typical institution (described earlier) maintains a perfect balance with its
environment. The key here is responsible adaptation: institutions have to
change to maintain the trust and support of their environment, but they
strive to do so without altering the core values and critical technology(Thompson, 1961) tharmake up their identity. Selznick viewed this "pres
ervation of institutional integrity" as the most important, but also most
difficult, task of institutional leadership. From serinick's (1957) perspec-
tive, responsible adaptation will not only keep the performance deficit in
check, but will also deepen institutionalizafion as it strengthens the trust
between the institution and its environment. At the same time, a failure to
adaptcan be seen as a symptom and a cause of deinstitutionalization (Kay
and Boxall, 2015). Figure22.r depicts the process of institutional eroÀion,
adaptation, and crisis.
The critical phase here is erosion, by which we mean the growth of the
performance deficit. Ansell and vogel e006, p.22) argue thatthis erosion
is most likely to happen in 'oextensively institutionalized policy sectors
in which routine decisions are delegated to experts or administrators
Erosion ADAPTAITON
Venue change Tone change
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Figure 22.1 The incubation process
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Strong institutionalization may entail elements of routinization, cogni-
tive biases, systemic interdependence, and vested interests; but it also tends
to entail the institutionalization of strong leadership, distinctive compe-
tences, and a well-integrated normative framework. while these features
may produce inertia, they also produce a high degree of collective and
reflexive agency. In theory, strong institutionalizationallows for everlast-
ing equilibrium. But that requires a certain type of leadership (Selznick
(1957) referred to the importance of protecting institutional integrity),
which balances institutionalized values against changing circumstances.
This would require leaders to scan their environment for threats, make
pre-emptive sacrifices to preserve core values, and rapidly forestall serious
threats. This high degree of collective and reflective agency enables
strongly institutionalized sectors to act responsively to avoid institutional
crises. we have referred to this process as "dynamic conservativism" 
-
strongly institutionalized sectors are motivated to conserve the integrity
of their institutions, but are capable of dynamic response in order to do so(Ansell, Boin, and Farjoun, 2015).
Paradoxically, the more effective institutional leadership is, the harder
it will be to sustain. Long-term success in preserving institutional integ-
rity tends to make people forget the importance of the balance between
immediate and long-term benefits. when the institution changes too fast
or adapts too little vis-à-vis its environment, institutional erosion kicks in
and the legitimacy gap is bound to widen.
RECONSIDERING THE "CRISIS_REFORM THESIS"(oR v/HY REFORM rS NOT A GIVEN)
The concept of punctuated equilibrium suggests a sharp distinction
between periods of stability and change or between ,oold,, and ,,new" equi-
libriums. The new equilibrium looks different from the old one, which has
been washed away by crisis and the subsequent reforms that see the light.
In this view, a causal relation between crisis and reform is simply assumed.
This dominant view we refer to in terms of the "crisis-reform thesis" (Boin
and Otten, 1996; Resodihardjo, 2009).
This crisis-reform thesis assumes institutions are inertial. policy is con-
trolled by relatively stable policy subsystems, which create stable institu-
tional venues for decision'making (Baumgartner and Jones, l99l). These
stable subsystems are supported by the maintenance of positive ,,policy
images." In stable policy areas, policy elites keep tight conlrol over policy
image and exclude regime opponents from participation in policy for-u-
tion. In the face of challenges, they shut out opposing fõrces, hunker
with little on-going attention or interest from the public.,, In institutions,
mission-driven professionals build on a track record of success. The legiti
macy of institutional arrangements is high. It is precisely these institutionsin which the notion of responsiveness 
-ierving the environment and per-
ceiving societal change 
- 
may get lost. Hence thi notion that ,.nothing failslike success."
This does not mean that highly institutionalized policy sectors will inevi-
tably fail and meet with an inititutional crisis. we árgu" tlrut a highiy insti-tutionalized policy sector is vulnerable to these incubation pro"""rr"r, u,people come to trust a policy sector (the hallmark of institution alizaïion),
the p.otential for disappointment is higher than it is for weakþlnstitu-
tionalized policy sectors, in which tubpu, performance and. ã hck of
responsiveness make up the policy image.
Selznick (1957) offers a way out of this conundrum. A strongly institu-
tionalized sector has, at least in theory, the capacity to produce ihå r.rpon-
sible adaptation that can keep a performan.. ¿"nóit in check. while somefeatures of strong institutionalizàtionmay encourage strong resistance to
change, others enhance the capacity for institutio lat aaapiutião. ioonginstitutions can produce the agency, reflexivity, u"o ayoä,ni. cãpacitiesthat make governing institutions anything but inertial. Because t'hey are
strongly institutionalized, sectors may havi the capacity, motivation, and
agen:y necessary to guide significant change pfocesses. we have devel-
oped this argument in more detail elsewherã (AnseÍ, Boin, and Farjoun,2015), but recap some major points here.
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down, and resist change. opponents must escalate conflict and shift the
venue if they are to gain control of the policy agenda. A crisis helps to
dislodge the status quo.
one proposed reason for this inertia is that institutional izationnurtures
routinization. strong institutions have well-established ways of doing
things, often developed through extensive experience. Bráking awayfrom routines can be highly disruptive, undermìning established p'utt.rn,
of working. New training and possibly new personner wilr be iequired
and this can be expensive. A second and often rerated reason is cognitive.Institutions guide our ways of knowing the world. They entail',,takenfor granted" understandings of how-things shourd be done and fowerful
"logics of appropriateness." A third arg'ment for the inertia islystemic
interdependence. Strong institutionaliàatíon often goes togethér withtightly coupled technologies or procedures that make it difficult to change
one element of a system without producing reverberating consequencesfor the rest of the system (perrow, 19g4). Àfourth type o? argumerrt forinertia is "vested interests." From this perspective, a süongty lnititutional_
ized policy sector is a poricy 
-ooopoiy with powerful patrons, or it pro-
duces benefits for a clientele that will resist fãrces for ihange itlri, i, trr"
"p_ositive feedback" path dependence argument; pierson, zoõo¡.'
. 
In this perspective, the odds are stacked against opponents of vested
interests and powerful erites. As Baumgartner lDal¡ urgu., in his drscus-
sion of nuclear power in France; theirìfforts are liiery-to be sisyphean.In a strongly institutionalized subsystem, it will be extremely diärcult togain allies or to shift venues. Thus, change is expected onty witt a .,uigbang" shock to the system 
- 
a Fukushim a-or a 9fir.If such är, .*og"ro*
shock does occur, this theory predicts new policy images, 
".r 
poir"y*ut-
ing venues, and a new dominant coalition in coniror olun .-"rging policy
subsystem. Out with the old and in with the new.
In certain cases, institutional crises are indeed followed by large-scale
reform proposals. But this is not always the case. An institutional crisis
can lead to a fundamental redesign of institutional arranj"-""1, i' upolicy sector' but it may arso be foilowed by the restoratioã of a rejuve-
nated status quo. Moreover, reform efforts âre not invariably successfur.
when reforms are ineffective, they may produce further disillusionment or
stagnarion (parashnik, 2008). while it ii possible that the orJ.q"ìriurioro
is fully restored or that an entirely o.* ,.ì of institution, r, prod"..¿, it i,far more likely that the old and new are interwoven.
our argument builds on the conceptualization of crises as .,turningpoints" that connect the past to the fuiure rather than ,,breakirrg poiotr,,that mark a clear disjuncture between the past regime u"d ã; ieform
regime (Boin and 't Hart, 2000, p.26). The effects oi.tir.r ããpá"i on the
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levels of institutional resilience they meet. This level of resilience, in turn,
is related to the level of institutionalizaLion of that policy sector and the
crisis management strategies employed by the elites therein (cf. Boin and ,t
Hart, 2003 ; Zahariadis, 20 I 3).
Our argument distinguishes between strong crisis management (high
agency) and weak crisis management (low agency). A strongly institu-
tionalized sector with high collective agency may be expected to respond
(perhaps late in the game) to the threats to the status quo that become
manifest in times of crisis. The leaders of these sectors will try to preserve
certain institutional elements by radically changing others, or they may
try to realign, recombine or repurpose existing institutional elements
to suggest a fair degree of responsiveness (Ansell, Trondal, and Øgard(forthcoming) refer to "institutional syncretism"; see also Berk and
Galvan, 2009). Different institutional crisis dynamics and agenda setting
patterns may be expected in weakly institutionalized policy sectors. Weak
institutionalization may produce stagnation and polaúzation and hence
result in inertia; instability and weak coordination may also result in
shifting and relatively incoherent responses over time.
In an institutionalized sector, we expect policy elites to be motivated
to defend their institutional order (Boin and Goodin, 2001).If they are,
they can adopt the strategy ofcooptation: incorporating threats that they
cannot ignore or reframe while preserving key values or competences. The
result is institutional syncretism. The old will not be thrown out for the
new, but rather there will be an emerging amalgam of old and new ele-
ments that responsively incorporates the challenging elements into legacy
institutions. This is close to the story told by selznick (1949) about the
institutional crisis faced by the Tennessee valley Authority (TVA) in its
early years. It also relates to the idea that strongly institutionalized policy
sectors will be inclined towards symbolic changes (cf. Meyer and Rowan,
1977).
An example of high institution-high agency would be the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (Boin, 2001; Dilulio, 1994). The Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), which came into existence in 1929, expanded from a
handful of prisons in the 1930s to well over 100 facilities across the country.
In each prison, guards and wardens worked according to a long-standing
correctional philosophy, which translared a few selected core values into
a sophisticated way of prison management. This shared culture stood the
test of time. The BOP managed to hold on to its philosophy of prison
operations, which was formulated by its early leaders sanford Bates and
James Bennett. This was no coincidence. As a responsive institution, the
Bureau maintained excellent working relations with Congress, the media,
and the judiciary. Bureau leaders steered the BOP through changing
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societal demands, a string of presidents, new interpretations of combat-
ing crime and the legitimacy of prison labor, and evir-decreasing budgets(Boin, 2001). while such changes put a severe strain on the BoÞ way of
working, they enabled the Bureau to preserye its institutional identity.
By extension, conventional accounts would argue that weak institution-
alization implies flexibility and less resistance to change. weakly insti-
tutionalized settings arc characterized. by pluralism, fragmentation, and
weak integration of different elements. weak institutionãüzation reduces
the cost of change and produces the flexibility that allows for rapid adap-
tation and improvisation. we may surmise, then, that adaptation is easier
for weakly institutionalized policy sætors (that entirely 1ãck the charac-
teristics of adaptive capacityrlaid out earlier). In a weakly institutional-
ized sector, in which there is no mission and core values are not widely
or deeply shared, a change of direction is much easier to initiate from
the outside. An adaptive response depends on entrepreneurial energy to
align and organize the loosely coupled elements of the system. Kingdon's(1984) "multiple streams" approach (MSA) describes this rogic: separate
activities in the problem, policy, and politics streams are joineá by a policy
entrepreneur at a "window of opportunity,, to produce policy chánge. Thepolicy entrepreneur injects agency into a weakiy instituiionaiized sètting.In the weakly institutionalized, row-agency situation, we cân expect
lower motivation and lower capacity to resist imposed ctrange. The barri-
ers to the introduction of new agendas are lower than in highly institution-
alized sectors, but the capacity to implement those agendal is atso weaker.
The fragmented and loosely coupled character oflhese regimes means
that responses to crisis conditions flow through them quicÈly, affecting
component parts in a heterogeneous fashion. As a result, new agendas
may be layered on old agendas, without displacing them. fhe ,.rrrìt 
-uybe the increasing complexity of the institutional ,.itor, without enhanced
rationality. This dynamic is likely to produce policy drift, with the sector
lurching from issue to issue depending on circumstance, responding to
crisis events like reeds blowing in the wind. while ad hoc responses may
stem criticism in the short term, they also lead to a slow burn t^hat periodi-
cally erupts. Alternatively, new agendas may rise and fall relativeiy easily
and quickly, but without substantiar effect, producing policy chuin. The
u.s. educational policy sector is a good example of this-kind of situation.In fact, it was here that the term "poricy churn" was coined (Hess, 1997).
This kind of sector then experiences a long-term low-grade institutional
crisis, with ongoing change, but without resorving the u'nderlying issues.In a weakly institutionalized sector with high ãg"n.y, *, *lgñt still see
another pattern of institutionar crisis dynamics. wtt.i"u, in th-e previous
case there is a reaction to crisis, it is not a truly responsive reaction.
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By contrast, in the weakly institutionalized, high-agency context, we are
likely to see periodic bursts of entrepreneurial energy transforming the
sector. New agendas will be used to temporarily unite the sector behind
a common enterprise. This agenda is not likely to be entirely new, nor
a mere reframing of the legacy agenda. Nor is it a layering of new ideas
without fully integrating them into old agendas. Instead, it is likely to
take elements of existing agendas and reorganize them around a common
unifying framework. This form of institutional innovation or bricolage
may take policy sectors towards a more strongly institutionalized domain.
tlowever, the policy sector ïs likeþ to remain lragile if its response rests
so\ely on the relational capïta\ of entrepreneurs rather than on deeper
pattetns of institutiona\rzation.
Roberts Q.013, 2006a) provides a vivrd example of this last pattern in his
description of the reorganization of FEMA during the Clinton adminis-
tration. Originalþ created during the Carter administration, FEMA was
a mish-mash of different civil defense and disaster preparedness programs
with little internal cohesion or professionalism (that is, weakly institution-
alized). A 1992 interim Congress report asserted that "FEMA is widely
viewed as a political dumping ground, a turkey farm, if you will, where
large numbers of positions exist that can be conveniently and quietly
filled by political appointment" (Gertz, 1992). The failure to deal with
hurricanes in the early 1990s led to the injection ofentrepreneurial energy
during the Clinton administration. With the support of President Clinton,
Director James Lee Witt realigned the disparate elements of the agency
under a unifying agenda of "all hazards response." This strategy down-
graded civil defense programs within FEMA and upgraded the disaster
preparedness programs:
FEMA has developed a sterling reputation for delivering disaster-relief ser-
vices, a far cry from its abysmal standing before James Lee Vy'itt took its helm in
1993. How did Witt turn FEMA around so quickly? Well, he is the first director
of the agency to have emergency-management experience. He stopped the staff-
ing of the agency by political patronage. He removed layers of bureaucracy.
Most important, he instilled in the agency a spirit of preparedness, of service to
the customer, of willingness to listen to ideas of local and state officials to make
the system work better. (Atlanta Journal Constitution,1996)
This pattern survived as long as Witt continued as leader and until
FEMA's mission was again shifted when it was incorporated into the
DHS (Roberts, 2013). In the wake of the 9lll attacks, FEMA's cel-
ebrated focus on all hazards was perceived to be at odds with the urgent
aim of strengthening civil defense and counterterrorism. The previously
independent agency (with direct access to the White House under Clinton)
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was absorbed by the much larger DHS and its leadership was replaced
by political appointees with little affinity with emergency managËment.
soon its strong reputation to provide immediate disaster ielief effãctively
seemed to be all there was left of its prior standing.
Table 22.r summarizes our argument. It captures the notion that insti-
tutionahzalion cuts two ways. Strong institutional izalion can encourage
institutional inertia, but it can also create capacity for preemptive change.If inertia is high and capacity for preemptivã change is low, ïe are in the
Table 22. 1 Institutional øisis and agenda change
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situation described by the traditional PET model of agenda setting. In this
case, policy sectors are able to resist change until they are overwhelmed
by a major exogenous shock and the outcome will be agenda replacement.
But strong institutionalization may also produce the institutional capacity
and leadership to anticipate and adapt to threats. Here the policy sector
pre-empts a major crisis by being selectively responsive. The result is
agenda renewal that incorporates some new elements while aligning them
with traditional institutions (dynamic conservatism). The same logic can
be applied to weak institutionalization. While weak institutionalization
might lower barriers to change, outcomes will depend on the capacity for
leadership. Where it is high, policy entrepreneurs may seize on the oppor-
tunity to reinvent agendas. This is the world of Kingdon's policy windows.
However, in weakly institutionalized sectors in which leadership is more
limited, reform efforts are themselves likely to be fragmented, producing
policy churn or drift.
CONCLUSION: INSIGHTS FOR THEORY AND
PRACTICE
In this chapter, we have sought to characterize the nature ofagenda setting
and institutional change that arises in so-called institutional crises. we
believe the imagery of PET, dominant in the crisis-reform thesis, hides
some important institutional dynamics. It misses the processes of change
that precede institutional crises. These changes may deepen the vulnerabil-
ity of a policy sector to an institutional crisis. We argue that change does
not always materialize as an exogenous shock from outside the system.
It is more likely to arise from an interaction of "internal', or endogenous
change and "external" or exogenous change.3
In addition, the crisis-reform thesis assumes that crisis will simply be
followed by change. Coincidentally or not, this change is perceived as
long awaited and mostly beneficial to the organization or sector under
discussion; crises emerge in these narratives as forces of good, which bring
necessary reforms that were not possible under the normal conditions of
institutional inertia. This chapter offers a more subtle relation between
crisis and reform. In our perspective, the outcome of these processes may
vary on the axis of change and restoration. Rarely is one policy image
vanquished to be replaced by an alternative policy paradigmthat justifies
a new institutional equilibrium. Instead, agendas themselves are likely to
preserve some core elements, while relinquishing or reframing others. The
outcome will depend on such factors as the level of institutionalization
and the strength of agency. The institutional syncretic view that we offer
Strong
institutionalization
Weak
institutionalization
Path dependence/
Punctuated equilibrium
High inertiallow agency
Agenda replacement
Classic punctuated
equilibrium case; resistance
to pre-crisis threats until
major shock challenges
system legitimacy
Change occurs through
loss of,lcontrol of agenda;
dominant coalition replaced
by opposition, which
introduces new agenda
Agenda drift or churn
Reforms occur through
ad hoc layering ofnew
elements or through ever-
shifting policy objectives;
periodic low-grade crisis
Agendas become more
complex or unstable,
without fundamental
change; stagnant or
polanzed political
situations; unstable
coalitions
Institutional syncretism
Low inertiøl high agency
.A.genda renewal
Dynamic conservativism;
responsive to pre-crisis
threats through selective
adaptation and cooptation
Traditional agendas
adaptively reframed to deal
with new threats; dominant
coalition maintains control of
agenda
Agenda reinvention
Reforms occur through
recombination, realignment,
and active improvisation
New unifying agendas
produced through
entrepreneurial realignment
of existing coalitions,
sometimes in ways that
transgress prior cleavages
L The media coverage of Hurricane Katrina was ten times higher than the total press
coverage on the four devastating hurricanes that struck Florid; in 2004. There was å sig-
nificant ¡elation between cove¡age on FEMA and waste or fraud, suggesting a negatiie
- 
tgne ofcoverage on the fede¡al ¡esponse (Freedman Consulting, ã006)l2. An example of such a trajectory is TVA's poricy shift tolroduóe nucrear energy(Hargrove, 1994).
3 ' This leads of us to conceive of the stressors that initiate a crisis phase as more like cata-lysts than triggers. A catalyst sets off a self-susraining set of råactions irrãi .iåntuuuv
leads to an institutional crisis, whether by setting off a media blitz or a series of iailures.
The catalyst interacts with the institutional vulneiabitities that have developedìnin. p..-
crisis incubation phase as the irìstitutional order drifts farther fto* 
"q"ifit.i"m. See foran example Kuipers' (200-6) study on the incubation olan institutionaj crisis concerning
the Dutch disability bénefit scheme in the 1990s.
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in this chapter thus leads to a different conception of institutional and
agenda change.
This perspective brings agency 
- 
especially the role of policy elites 
-back into the picture. It suggests that policy leaders can prev;nt insti-
tutional crises by focusing on processes of institutional erosion, which
will stretch performance deficits to the breaking point of crisis. whereas
leaders of weakly institutionalized sectors may indeed exploit a crisis
to adopt reforms, our perspective suggests that policy leadirs in highly
institutionalized sectors should be especially sensitive to the necessity of
continuous adaptation.
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